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Abstract 
 
In this paper we propose a theory of investment and energy use to study the response 
of macroeconomic aggregates to energy price shocks. In our theory this response depends 
on the interaction between the energy efficiency built in capital goods (which is irreversible 
throughout their lifetime) and the growth rate of Investment Specific Technological Change 
(ISTC hereafter). ISTC reduces the cost to produce investment goods and renders them 
more productive. Depending on which effect is stronger, higher ISTC is a complement or a 
substitute for energy efficiency and, thus, affects differently aggregate energy demand. Our 
theory provides a discipline to identify both effects since it predicts that the relative price of 
investment goods (not quality adjusted as well as quality adjusted) depends not only on the 
two ISTC shocks but also on the energy efficiency built into capital units. Thus, we can 
disentangle the effects of ISTC shocks from the effects of energy efficiency: a distinction that 
the literature on ISTC growth abstracts from. Our theory can account for the fall of energy 
use per unit of output observed during the 1990s, a period in which energy prices fell below 
trend. By increasing investment in the years of high ISTC growth, the economy was 
increasing the average efficiency of the economy (the capital-energy ratio), shielding the 
economy against the impact of the 2003-08 price shock. 
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1 Introduction
The two oil crises in the 1970s and a growing environmental awareness of societies and governments
have prompted many macroeconomists to study the determinants of aggregate energy use and,
therefore, the response of macroeconomic aggregates to changes in energy prices.1 Early studies
estimated a very low short run price elasticity of energy demand, which accounted for the large
impact of the oil price shocks in the 1970s (see Berndt and Wood 1975, Griffin and Gregory 1976,
and Pindyck 1979). The same authors also report that this elasticity is higher in the long run, as the
economies reduce their energy consumption slowly. More recently, Newell et al. (1999), and Popp
(2002) find that energy prices have a strong positive effect on energy-efficient technical innovations,
suggesting that the difference between the short and long run price elasticities of energy demand is
due to the ability of the economies to move to more energy-efficient technologies.2 Lately, though,
it has been pointed out that innovation in energy efficiency is affected, even delayed, by the level
of Investment Specific Technical Change (ISTC hereafter); see, for instance Steinbuks and Neuhoff
(2010), or Knittel (2011).3 This evidence suggests three things: First, that energy demand is very
much related to the efficiency of the technologies chosen; second, that the level of energy efficiency
responds to changes in energy prices and, third, that the existence of Investment Specific Technical
Change (ISTC hereafter) affects the magnitude of that response. Following this line of thought,
in this paper we propose a theory of vintage capital investment to investigate the importance of
ISTC growth in shaping the response of energy demand (and use) and macroeconomic aggregates
to energy price shocks.
In our model economy capital is irreversible and heterogeneous in two dimensions: its vintage
and its energy-efficiency. As in Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), the energy efficiency of a unit of capital
is given by the energy required for this capital to yield services. Higher efficiency comes at the cost
of less capital services and, therefore, less output. Unlike Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), we assume
that there is ISTC growth as in Solow (1960). Hence, aggregate energy use per unit of output may
fall because either new capital is more energy efficient or is more productive per unit of energy
1See Hamilton (2008) or Kilian (2008) for a survey of the significant literature.
2Newell et al. (1999) estimate that during the period 1958-1993 about half of the total change in energy efficiency
of the models of room air conditioners, central air conditioners, and gas water heaters was prompted by the high
price shocks experienced during the 1970s and early 1980s.
3Knittel (2011) estimates that if car quality would have not improved from 1980 to 2006, energy efficiency of both
passenger cars and light trucks could have increased by nearly 60 percent from 1980 to 2006, instead of the observed
meager 15 percent.
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consumed, or both things at the same time. To focus our study in the determinants of energy
use and efficiency, we assume that all energy is imported and that the energy price is exogenously
given. Moreover, there is no rationing: the amount of energy demanded at any given price is always
satisfied. This is a closed economy in any other respect.
We start by studying the properties of the efficient allocation. We show that we can decentralize
it by opening a secondary market for capital goods. In our economy the market price of one unit of
capital depends not only on its vintage but also on its energy efficiency. Standard aggregation (i.e.,
representing aggregate value added as a function of aggregate capital and labor) is not possible in
this economy, in general. This is so because the complementarity of capital and energy at the micro
level implies that the energy share in aggregate gross output varies with the distribution of capital
across vintages and efficiency levels. We can, however, establish conditions under which there is
a representation for aggregate gross output as a function of aggregate labor, capital, and energy.
This representation is obtained by aggregating capital using prices in units of gross output that
are, essentially, cost production prices. This procedure is consistent with the method used by the
Bureau of Economic Analysis (and other statistical agencies in different countries) to construct the
aggregate stock of capital of the US economy. The aforementioned cost production prices depend
on the vintage as well as the energy efficiency of capital. We also find aggregate capital adjusted
by quality and its corresponding price. Consistently with the estimates by Gordon (1990) and
Cummins and Violante (2002), this price falls with the level of ISTC, but it rises with the level
of energy efficiency. That is, the relative price of capital goods falls less rapidly in periods in
which the economy is investing more in energy efficiency, as it happened in the 1970s. Thus, we
provide a theoretical foundation to the view expressed by Gordon (1996), who argued that changes
in energy efficiency is one of the key determinants of the dynamics of the relative price of investment
goods. Finally, we show that our theory encompasses previous theories of investment and energy
use: Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) and Díaz et al. (2004) are special cases of our economy without
ISTC growth.
The aggregate representation of our economy shows very starkly that the existence of ISTC
has two effects of opposite sign on aggregate energy use. On the one hand, new investment is
needed to rip the benefits of higher ISTC, which rises the absolute level of energy use. On the other
hand, higher ISTC, ceteris paribus, rises capital productivity and output, which lowers the level of
energy use per unit of output. Depending on which effect is higher, ISTC can be thought of as an
2
energy-consuming or an energy-saving technical device. In the first case ISTC and energy efficiency
are complements, in the second case they are substitutes. This complex interaction of ISTC and
energy efficiency —which also depends on the behavior of energy prices— cannot be ascertained
theoretically. This is why we resort to study the dynamics of aggregate energy use and energy
efficiency in our model economy quantitatively.
We calibrate our model economy to match selected statistics of the US economy for the period
1960-2008. We assume that there are energy price shocks as well as two ISTC shocks. The two
ISTC shocks affect the cost of producing capital goods and the level of technical progress embodied
in new capital units. We disentangle these two shocks by exploiting the fact that the BEA adjusts
for quality the price of some (but not all) investment goods. We prefer to abstract from neutral
technological progress to isolate the effects of ISTC shocks on energy efficiency and use. We estimate
the three processes so that the relative price of energy and the relative prices of investment—both
the non quality-adjusted as well as the quality-adjusted price—in the model have the statistical
properties of their counterparts in the data. The identification of the two ISTC shocks becomes a
central issue in order to assess the quantitative properties of our model economy. It turns out that
our theory gives us discipline to implement a novel way to identify both shocks, provided that only
one of them is permanent. We can identify them because, according to our theory, the relative price
of investment goods (not quality adjusted as well as quality adjusted) depends not only on the two
ISTC shocks but also on the energy efficiency built into capital units. Hence, we can disentagle
the effects of ISTC shocks from the effects of energy efficiency. It is interesting to note that the
innovations in ISTC shocks are larger and highly correlated right after the oil price shocks during
the early 1980s and during the late 1990s, right before the 2003-08 oil price shock. In order to assess
the importance of ISTC we compare the evolution of energy use and aggregate energy efficiency in
our simulated economy and a version of Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) (which is essentially our economy
without ISTC) to the observed evolution of energy use and efficiency in the US economy for the
aforementioned periods.
Our simulations show that investment in energy efficiency depends on the persistence of energy
price shocks and the nature and persistence of ISTC shocks. If energy prices are high and ISTC in
the quality of new investment are low, agents prefer to invest in energy efficient capital goods. This
is the regime observed in the 1970s and 1980s, where energy use per unit of output and the average
efficiency in the economy are negatively and positively correlated with energy prices, respectively.
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If energy prices are low and ISTC shocks to the quality of new investment are high and transitory,
agents invest in less efficient capital goods. In this case the correlation of energy use per unit of
output and average energy efficiency with energy prices is reversed. Thus, our model economy can
explain the regime change experienced during the 1990s, period of accelerated ISTC growth. A
model economy without ISTC growth, as Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), cannot explain this change
of regime, since in that economy the level of energy efficiency is solely governed by energy prices.
Finally, we show that the short run price elasticity of energy use per unit of value added is equal to
the value of the energy share in value added. Thus, we can quantify the regime change experienced.
For instance, at the peak years 1981 and 2008 the real relative price of energy was about the
same, a bit higher in 2008. The energy share, though, was 8.89 percent and 6.66 percent of value
added, respectively. Thus, according to our theory, energy use has been less responsive to changes
in energy prices during the last oil price shock because energy efficiency is much higher than in
previous decades. Thus, our theory offers an explanation about the apparent softened response of
GDP to the 2003-08 oil price shock. See for instance, Kilian (2008), or Blanchard and Galí (2007).
We view ours as a theory of investment where we make explicit the determinants of energy use
and energy-saving technical change. Thus, ours has a flavor of a theory of directed technical change,
as Acemoglu (2002), and Acemoglu et al. (2012), although the former studies the determinants
of skill biased technical change whereas the latter focus on the substitution from environmental
damaging to friendly technologies. A related work to ours is that by Hassler et al. (2012), who
build on the tradition of Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) and use an aggregate production function
to calibrate a measure of energy-saving technical change consistent with the US experience, although
they ignore the existence of Investment Specific Technical Change.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our model economy and defines
a quasi-social planner problem whose solution is the efficient allocation of our economy. In Section
3 we discuss the role of investment specific technological change. In Section 4 we describe how
we calibrate our economy and our procedure to identify investment specific technological shocks.
Section 5 presents our main results about the time series properties of our model economy in
connection with the evidence. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The benchmark model economy
Here we present our benchmark model economy where investment specific technological change
plays a central role.
2.1 Preferences
There is a continuum of households that seek to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (`t)) , β ∈ (0, 1) ξ > 0, (2.1)
where ct is consumption and `t is leisure t. Each household is endowed with h¯ units of time and,
therefore, works h¯− `t hours every period.
2.2 Technology and the physical environment
Production of the unique final good is carried out at a continuum of autonomous plants. A plant
is created by installing one unit of capital. Plants are indexed by the vintage of the unit of capital
installed, denoted by z, and the energy efficiency with which that unit of capital must be operated,
denoted by v. Output is produced combining labor and the services of the unit of capital installed
according to the technology
yt (z, v) = At κt (z, v)
α ht (z, v)
1−α , z ≤ t, v ∈ IR++, (2.2)
with α ∈ (0, 1). At is the neutral technological change factor; whereas κt (z, v) and ht (z, v) are,
respectively, the amount of services provided by the unit of capital installed and the amount of
labor services employed in the plant.
As we have already mentioned, capital is heterogeneous in two dimensions: Its vintage, z, and
its energy efficiency, v. The vintage is given by the date at which the unit of capital was produced.
Thus, z ≤ t. The efficiency type v takes values in IR++. In order to yield services the unit of capital
needs to be combined with energy. The type v determines the amount of energy, et(z, v), needed to
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produce the amount κt(z, v) of capital services:
κt (z, v) = Λz Γz v
1−µ min
{
et (z, v) ,Γ
−1
z v
µ
}
, z ≤ t, v ∈ IR++, (2.3)
where µ > 1. Λz and Γz refer to embodied investment specific technical change. As shown in
Figure 1, energy efficiency type v and embodied investment specific technological change are meant
to refer to different factors. We may think of type v as engine power of a car. When the car is
used at optimal speed the energy consumed is Γ−1z vµ. In this case, the services yielded by the
unit of capital are κt(z, v) = Λz v. Since µ > 1, energy consumption at optimal speed is more
than proportional to engine power. When the amount of energy consumed is less than the amount
required to drive at optimal speed, the amount of services decreases with the efficiency type v,
κt(z, v) = Λz Γz v
1−µ et(z, v), although it increases with energy consumption. This assumption
implies that a SUV car may yield less services when driven in downtown, at suboptimal speed, than
a smaller car equipped with less engine power. Λz refers to technological improvements that increase
capital services which are not directed to save energy, whereas Γz refers to innovations that save
energy directly. For instance, any improvement in the ergonomics of car seats, so that driving is less
tiring, would be an increase in Λz, whereas improvements in the aerodynamics of the car would rise
its energy efficiency, and should be considered as increases in Γz.4 Thus, embodied technological
progress has a dual nature in our theory: it augments productivity and lowers energy consumption
given the engine power, v. Either factor, Λz, and Γz, may vary stochastically over time in a manner
specified in Section 4. For simplicity, we will call a pair (z, v) a technology class, and κt(z, v) will
be the amount services yielded by a unit of capital of class (z, v) at period t. Likewise, kt(z, v) is
the amount of capital of class (z, v) at time t.
Additionally, there is a technology that allows agents to transform final good of period t into
Θt units of capital of vintage t+ 1. Thus, as it is standard in the literature, we take the view that
investment specific technological change not only brings higher quality but also the production of
capital goods becomes increasingly efficient with the passage of time (see, for instance, Greenwood
et al. 1997). Specifically, we will denote as xt(v) the amount of final good invested in capital of
vintage t+ 1 that will be operated with efficiency type v ∈ IR++ at period t+ 1. The factor Θt may
vary stochastically over time. Thus, notice that changes in Λt+1, Γt+1 or Θt shift the technological
frontier whereas changes in v are movements along the technological frontier.
4See Knittel (2011) for particular examples of both types of embodied technical innovations.
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The number of plants of class (z, v) is equal to the amount of capital of that class, kt(z, v).
Notice that while the vintage is given exogenously by the time at which the unit of capital was
produced, the measure of classes respond to economic conditions. Capital is irreversible; that is,
capital of vintage z1 cannot be converted in capital of vintage z2. Likewise, capital is irreversible
across efficiency types. Capital of vintage z of efficiency type v1 cannot be transformed into type
v2. This amounts to saying that plants of class (z, v) cannot be converted into plants of a different
class. The plant, though, can be left idle by not allocating either energy or labor. Finally, once
production has taken place, the plant faces a positive probability of death, $ ∈ [0, 1], which is i.i.d.
across plants. This death implies the destruction of the unit of capital. This death probability plays
the role of physical depreciation of capital. Therefore,
kt(z, v) = (1−$)t−z kz(z, v), z ≤ t, v ∈ IR++. (2.4)
2.3 Energy consumption and energy prices
We will assume that energy is entirely bought in an international market at an exogenously given
price %t. Therefore, from the point of view of the economic agents, the energy price follows a
stochastic process. We assume that there is no international borrowing and lending. In absence
of an international credit market we can think of the price of energy as given by nature. This
implies that, under market completeness, the Second Welfare Theorem applies and, therefore, we
can restrict our attention to efficient allocations.
2.4 Aggregate value added
The amount of aggregate labor used in the production of the final good satisfies
0 ≤ `t ≤ h¯−
t∑
z=−∞
∞∫
0
kt(z, v)ht(z, v) d v, 0 ≤ ht(z, v) ≤ h¯, z ≤ t, v ∈ IR++, (2.5)
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Aggregate value added, vat, is aggregate production of the final good net of energy expenditures.
The feasibility constraint is
ct +
∞∫
0
xt (v) d v ≤ vat ≡
t∑
z=−∞
∞∫
0
kt(z, v) [yt(z, v)− %t et(z, v)] d v, (2.6)
where ct denotes consumption, and
∞∫
0
xt (v) d v is aggregate investment. Thus,
0 ≤ kt+1(t+ 1, v) ≤ Θt xt (v) . (2.7)
2.5 Properties of the efficient allocation
The efficient allocation is found by maximizing (2.1) subject to (2.3)–(2.7). The planning problem
is fully specified in Appendix B. In Appendix C we show the decentralized version of our economy.
There we show that we can price capital of all classes by opening a secondary market for plants.
In what follows we are going to characterize the efficient allocation and provide conditions that
guarantee that the economy can be aggregated.
Lemma 1. Marginal productivity of labor is the same across all plants operated:
(1− α)At κt(z, v)αht(z, v)−α = u` (ct, `t)
uc (ct, `t)
. (2.8)
This is a direct consequence of labor being freely mobile across plants. In the decentralized version
of our economy (shown in Appendix C) the price of one unit of labor services is wt ≡ u`(ct,`t)uc(ct,`t) . Thus,
Lemma 1 implies that the labor share in gross output is the same in all plants. Now we turn to
investigate which classes of capital are allocated energy.
Proposition 1. If at time t a plant of class (z, v), z ≤ t, v > 0, is operated, et(z, v) > 0, then it is
operated at the requirement level, et(z, v) = Γ−1z vµ and κt(z, v) = Λz v.
Proof. Consider the Lagrangian
max
et(z,v)
At
(
Λz Γz v
1−µet(z, v)
)α
ht(z, v)
1−α−%t et(z, v)+Ψe1t (z, v)
(
Γ−1z v
µ − et(z, v)
)
+Ψe0t (z, v) et(z, v).
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(2.9)
For any plant for which ht(z, v) > 0, if 0 < et(z, v) < Γ−1z vµ, then Ψ
e0
t (z, v) = 0, and it must be
the case that
αAt
(
Λz Γz v
1−µ)α et(z, v)α−1ht(z, v)1−α − %t = Ψe1t (z, v). (2.10)
Using (2.3) and (2.8), expression (2.10) becomes
αA
1
α
t
(
1− α
wt
) 1−α
α
Λz Γz v
1−µ − %t = Ψe1t (z, v), (2.11)
where wt ≡ u`(ct,`t)uc(ct,`t) . Notice that expression (2.11) does not depend on et(z, v). Thus if Ψ
e1
t (z, v) is
positive, then et(z, v) = Γ−1z vµ, and κt(z, v) = Λz v.
Thus, it is never efficient to operate a plant using less energy than the requirement level. Proposition
1 and expressions (2.2) and (2.8) imply that production at the plant level, relative to production of
the latest vintage, only depends on its class:
Corollary 1. The amount of output produced and labor used, relative to the aggregate, in a plant
only depend on the class of the plant; thus,
ht+i (z, vz)
ht+i (t, vt)
=
yt+i (z, vz)
yt+i (t, vt)
=
Λz
Λt
vz
vt
, for all i ≥ 0. (2.12)
This Corollary describes how labor is allocated across plants. Labor is withdrawn gradually from
older and less efficient plants and placed in newer and more efficient plants. Therefore, output
produced by older and less efficient classes is reduced gradually. Labor (and energy) allocated to
plants becomes zero whenever production is too low compared to the required energy expenditure.
The cut-off point is implied by the non-negativity of the first order condition shown in equation
(2.11) in Proposition 1.
Corollary 2. For a plant of class (z, v) to be utilized in equilibrium it must be the case that
αA
1
α
t
(
1− α
wt
) 1−α
α
Λz v − %t Γ−1z vµ ≥ 0, (2.13)
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where wt ≡ u`(ct,`t)uc(ct,`t) . For each vintage z there exists a a type vz t for which (2.13) holds with strict
equality. The type vz t decreases with %t and increases with z.
In the decentralized version of this economy, expression (2.13)—which is the same that the first
order condition shown in (2.11)—is the profit accrued in a plant of class (z, v). Thus, expression
(2.13) says that for a plant to be utilized, profit has to be non-negative. This profit is equal to the
return to capital net of energy expenditure, and it increases with the level of embodied technical
change, Λz and Γz, and decreases with v. Profit accrued is zero at the marginal type vz t.
The difference in energy expenditure across classes of capital has implications at the aggregate
level. The share of energy in aggregate value adedd (and, therefore, those of capital and labor)
depends on the entire distribution of capital across classes. This property will have consequences
for the aggregation of our economy. Let us turn now to analyze the investment decision and the
characteristics of new plants.
Proposition 2. If all installed capital is always utilized, et(z, v) > 0, for all t, z, and v, then, all
units of new capital are operated with the same level of energy efficiency, vt+1 > 0.
Proof. The first order condition with respect to investment allocated to type v, xt(v), is
Θ−1t ϕt −Ψkt (v) = Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i [α yt+i(t+ 1, v)− %t+i et+i(t+ 1, v)] , (2.14)
where ϕt is marginal utility of consumption at time t. Investment in type v is positive only if
Ψkt (v) = 0. This multiplier is non negative so zero is its minimum value. Thus, we have to show
that Ψkt (v) has a unique minimum. Equivalently, present value of capital income, shown in the
right hand side of (2.14), has a unique maximum. Using (2.8) and the result of Proposition 1 and
plugging them in the expression of output at the plant level, (2.2), we can write (2.14) as
Θ−1t ϕt −Ψkt (v) = Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i
[
αA
1
α
t+i
(
1− α
wt+i
) 1−α
α
Λt+1 v − %t+i Γ−1t+1 vµ
]
, (2.15)
where wt+i ≡ u`(ct+i,`t+i)uc(ct+i,`t+i) . The right hand side of (2.15) has a unique maximum in v, that we call
vt+1, and it satisfies
α
µ
Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i yt+i (t+ 1, vt+1) = Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i %t+i Γ−1t+1 vµt+1, (2.16)
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that is, the present value of all future energy expenditures in a plant that uses a unit of capital of
vintage t+ 1 is the fraction α/µ of the present value of future gross output produced by that plant.
Hence the price of one unit of new capital, Θ−1t , must be equal to the fraction α(µ − 1)/µ of the
present value of future gross output.
This Proposition shows that if all plants are always utilized, it is welfare improving to place all
new investment in only one efficiency type, the one that maximizes the present value of future
output produced in the plant net of energy expenditures and imputed labor income. Notice that
manipulating (2.16) we obtain that the efficiency vt+1 satisfies
vµ−1t+1 = Λt+1 Γt+1
Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i αA
1
α
t+i
(
1−α
wt+i
) 1−α
α
µEt
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i %t+i
. (2.17)
Thus, at any time t investment will be allocated to a unique technology class (t+ 1, vt+1) and in
period t+ 1 all capital of vintage t+ 1 will be operated with the same energy efficiency.
2.6 Aggregation
We would like to represent aggregate value added as a function of aggregate capital. In order to
aggregate capital we need to define appropriate relative prices for each class. It is easy to do so for
the latest vintage produced, since its shadow price must be equal to the inverse of the productivity
in the production of capital goods, Θ−1t , but we do not have an equivalent measure for the previous
vintages. Therefore, we define a price for any class of capital in the following way:
Definition 1. Let the cost of one unit of capital of class (z, v), z ≤ t + 1, vz ∈ IR++, in units of
gross output at time t be defined as
qt (z, vz) ≡ Θ−1t
Λz
Λt+1
vz
vt+1
, z ≤ t+ 1, v ∈ IR++. (2.18)
Notice that capital goods of the same vintage may have different prices, depending on their energy
efficiency. This is consistent with Gordon (1990, 1996), who argued that not all changes in the
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relative price of capital goods are due to investment specific technical change but also to changes
in energy efficiency (see Gordon 1996, p. 262).
We need to emphasize that the price defined above is not the market price of a unit of capital of
class (z, v) at time t, since it does not measure the present value of the expected return to one unit
of capital net of energy expenditures. The price shown in (2.18) is the cost of capital of class (z, vz)
in units of gross output at period t. Appendix C shows the decentralized version of this economy
and that the market price of one unit of capital of class (z, v) at time t ≥ z is
pt (z, vz) =
Λz vz
Λt+1 vt+1
Θ−1t +
(
Λz vz
Λt+1 vt+1
− Γ
−1
z v
µ
z
Γ−1t+1 v
µ
t+1
)
Θ−1t
µ− 1 . (2.19)
This price takes into account the associated cost of energy; that is, pt (z, vz) is the price of capital
in units of value added. Notice that this price is higher than the cost price qt (z, vz) if
Λz vz
Γ−1z vµz
>
Λt+1 vt+1
Γ−1t+1 v
µ
t+1
. (2.20)
That is, if the ratio of capital services to energy for class (z, vz) is higher than the corresponding
ratio for the new capital of class (z, vz). Unless all capital is operated with the same energy efficiency
the market price of capital and its cost in units of gross output are different.
It could be argued that we should find aggregate capital using market prices. We would do so if
we could represent aggregate value added solely as a function of labor and capital, which we cannot
do because of the complementarity of capital and energy at the plant level. This complementarity
implies that factor shares in aggregate value added depend on the distribution of capital across
vintages. As a consequence, we cannot write aggregate value added as a function of aggregate
primary inputs. We can, however, find aggregate gross output since the share of labor in gross
output is constant regardless of the capital vintage and energy efficiency.5
5See Sato (1976) for a more detailed discussion on the issue of aggregation.
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2.6.1 Aggregate capital and its relative price
Let us define as kt the aggregate volume of capital, in per capita terms, in units of the latest class.
Thus,
kt =
t∑
z=−∞
qt (z, vz)
qt (t, vt)
kt (z, vz) . (2.21)
Taking into account that investment takes place in only one class of capital, we can express capital
as
kt =
t∑
z=−∞
Λz
Λt
vz
vt
(1−$)t−z Θz−1 xz−1. (2.22)
The product ΛzΛt
vz
vt
(1−$)t−z can be interpreted as the remaining value of the stock of class (z, vz)
(per unit of capital) once physical depreciation and obsolescence are taken into account. In other
words, the average depreciation rate of capital class (z, vz) at time t is
δt (z, vz) = 1− (1−$)
(
Λz
Λt
vz
vt
) 1
t−z
. (2.23)
The average relative price (cost) of capital in units of consumption good is, by definition of kt, equal
to the relative price of vintage t and type vt.
qt =
t∑
z=−∞
qt (z, vz)
kt (z, vz)
kt
=
Λt
Λt+1
vt
vt+1
Θ−1t . (2.24)
We can also find the aggregate amount of capital services or, in other words, the amount of quality-
adjusted capital:
κt = Λt vt
t∑
z=−∞
qt (z, vz) kt (z, vz) = Λt vt kt. (2.25)
Now we can define the cost of quality-adjusted capital; that is, the cost of capital services,
Definition 2. Let the cost of one unit of capital services of class (z, vz), z ≤ t + 1, vz ∈ IR++, in
units of gross output at time t be defined as
qκt ≡
qt(z, v)
λz vz
, z ≤ t+ 1, v ∈ IR++. (2.26)
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This price is equal to Θ−1t Λ
−1
t+1v
−1
t+1 for all classes of capital.
Consistently with Gordon (1990) and Cummins and Violante (2002), this price falls when ISTC
rises, as measured by Θt Λt+1, but it rises when energy efficiency rises; that is, when vt+1 falls.
Thus, when agents invest in improving energy efficiency of new capital, the relative price of new
capital rises, as it was suggested by Gordon (1996). Thus, our theory says that we cannot attribute
all changes in the relative price of investment to ISTC but also to changes in energy efficiency.
This method to define the aggregate net stock of capital is consistent with the procedure used by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (and other statistical agencies in different countries) to measure
the real value of the net stock of capital. The only difference is that the BEA defines the stock of
capital in units of output; in our notation:
k˜t =
t∑
z=−∞
(1−$)t−zΛz
Λt
vz
vt
Θz−1
Θt−1
xz−1 =
t∑
z=−∞
(1−$)t−z q
κ
t−1
qκz−1
xz−1. (2.27)
Notice that k˜t is equal to our stock of quality-adjusted capital valued at prices at the beginning of
the period, k˜t = qκt−1 κt, which is equal to Θ
−1
t−1 kt. The BEA depreciates investment realized at time
z−1 by applying economic depreciation rates which include physical decay as well as obsolescence.6
In terms of our theory, the obsolescence component of the depreciation rate must be given by the
change in the quality-adjusted relative price of investment, qκt−1/qκz−1. As a matter of fact, this is
the procedure followed by Cummins and Violante (2002) to calibrate the physical depreciation rate
of capital. We add to their analysis by providing a theory of how the relative price of investment
depends on energy efficiency and, therefore, energy prices.
2.6.2 Output, hours worked and energy use
Production of all plants of class (z, v) is the expected output of a plant of vintage z which, using
(2.12) can be written as
yt =
t∑
z=−∞
Λz
Λt
vz
vt
kt (z, vz) yt (t, vt) . (2.28)
6See Bureau of Economic Analysis (2003) for a detailed description of the perpetual inventory method used to
construct the aggregate stock of capital measure.
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Likewise, using (2.8) and (2.18) we can write aggregate labor as
ht =
t∑
z=−∞
Λz
Λt
vz
vt
kt (z, vz)ht (t, vt) = kt ht (t, vt) . (2.29)
Aggregate gross output is
yt = At Λ
α
t (vt kt)
α h1−αt . (2.30)
Likewise, aggregate energy consumption is
et =
t∑
z=−∞
Γ−1z v
µ
z kt (z, vz) . (2.31)
2.6.3 The aggregated economy
The law of motion of capital is
kt+1 = Θt xt + (1−$) Λt
Λt+1
vt
vt+1
kt. (2.32)
Since all plants are utilized in equilibrium, the law of motion of energy consumption is
et+1 = Γ
−1
t+1 v
µ
t+1 Θt xt + (1−$) et. (2.33)
The quasi-social planner’s problem as
max
ct, xt,
vt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (h¯− ht))
s. t. ct + xt ≤ At (Λt vt kt)α h1−αt − %t et,
et+1 ≥ Γ−1t+1 vµt+1 Θt xt + (1−$) et,
0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ Θt xt + (1−$) ΛtΛt+1 vtvt+1 kt,
k0 given, vt+1 ≥ 0, xt ≥ 0.
(2.34)
Notice that at time t, the amount of energy energy consumed is a state variable. This is a direct
consequence of all capital installed being used in equilibrium. It will be useful to write the quasi-
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social planner’s problem in terms of quality-adjusted capital using (2.25):
max
ct, xt,
vt+1
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (h¯− ht))
s. t. ct + xt ≤ At καt h1−αt − %t et,
et+1 ≥ Γ−1t+1 vµt+1 Θt xt + (1−$) et,
0 ≤ κt+1 ≤ vt+1 Λt+1 Θt xt + (1−$)κt,
κ0 given, vt+1 ≥ 0, xt ≥ 0.
(2.35)
Hence, by solving this planner’s problem we can find the aggregates of our decentralized economy.
Notice that the evolution of the aggregate stock of capital is shown in (2.32). Finally, we need to add
the condition that ensures that this aggregation works: all installed capital is used in equilibrium.
Using (2.13) with strict inequality, we can write the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The energy price is never too large,
αAt κ
α−1
t h
1−α
t Λz vz > %t Γ
−1
z v
µ
z , for all z ≤ t+ 1. (2.36)
Expression (2.36) is equivalent to (2.13) with strict inequality. Multiplying both sides of the in-
equality by kt (z, vz) and adding across vintages the inequality becomes
αAt κ
α
t h
1−α
t > %t et. (2.37)
That is, the share of energy in value added cannot exceed gross capital income.
3 The role of investment specific technological change
In this section we want to highlight the effect of investment specific technical change on the choice
of energy efficiency. To this purpose, we want to compare our theory with that of Atkeson and
Kehoe (1999) and our previous work Díaz et al. (2004).
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3.1 The cost of saving energy in a putty-clay model economy
Let us turn now to the economy proposed by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999). Their economy is essentially
ours in absence of ISTC but, still, capital is irreversible. We show in Appendix F the mapping of
their economy to our economy in detail. The evolution of the microeconomic aggregates is given by
the following equations:
ct + xt = At κ
α
t h
1−α
t − %t et, (3.1)
et+1 = v
µ
t+1 xt + (1−$) et, (3.2)
κt+1 = vt+1 xt + (1−$)κt. (3.3)
In this economy capital and energy are complements in the short run. To go straight to the
point, assume that agents do not value leisure so that ht = h¯ every period. Thus, right after an
unexpected positive energy price shock at a given period t, the economy cannot reduce its energy
consumption (and, therefore, its energy bill) so that the immediate effect is a fall in aggregate value
added, yt − %tet. If the energy price has persistence, the expected price will rise, too. This reduces
the future return to current investment. The only way that this economy has to reduce its energy
consumption in future periods is by investing less (lower xt) or by making new capital more efficient;
i.e, by reducing vt+1 and increasing the capital-energy ratio. In either case the impact of an energy
price rise is propagated into the future as less capital services and, therefore, less aggregate value
added. By making capital more energy-efficient the economy reduces its energy bill. This implies
that energy use (i.e., energy consumption per unit of value added) falls. Thus, energy use and the
capital to energy ratio will track the evolution of the energy price, with a delay which will be longer
the lower the depreciation rate $. Moreover, the relative price of quality-adjusted capital, which is
just equal to v−1t+1, will increase, reflecting the rise in the energy price. Let us turn now to examine
our economy with investment specific technological change.
3.2 Investment specific technological change and energy efficiency
Let us turn now to our economy with ISTC. The expression of aggregate gross output and aggregate
value added is the same as in the Atkeson and Kehoe’s economy. The evolution of capital services
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and energy consumption is given by the expressions:
et+1 = Γ
−1
t+1 v
µ
t+1 Θt xt + (1−$) et, (3.4)
κt+1 = vt+1 Λt+1 Θt xt + (1−$)κt. (3.5)
The first thing that stands out in the laws of motion shown above is that ISTC have different effects
on the evolution of energy consumption and quality-adjusted capital. An ISTC change have a dual
effect: it allows to produce more machines and it allows to produce better machines at the same cost
in units of output. In our economy the first effect is captured by the Θt shock and the second one
is captured by Λt+1 and Γt+1. Higher Θt or lower Γt+1 entail higher energy consumption, whereas
higher Λt+1 entails higher capital services and lower energy use (i.e., per unit of value added).
Thus, ISTC and energy efficiency are complements or substitutes depending on the nature of the
ISTC shocks. If embodied technical shocks, Λt+1 and Γt+1, are low relative to shocks in the cost of
producing capital, Θt, an energy price rise will prompt investing in energy efficiency, more so that
in an economy in which all technical progress is neutral. On the other hand, if the price falls in a
period in which there is an acceleration in embodied technical change, the economy will not invest in
energy efficiency, less so that in an economy in which all technical progress is neutral. We will turn
to discuss all these interactions in more detail in section 5, where we illustrate quantitatively the
ability of our model economy to account for the observed dynamics of energy use, the capital-energy
ratio and other macroeconomic aggregates.
3.3 Capital adjustment costs as a short-cut for capital irreversibility
Let us now turn to the specification by Díaz, Puch, and Guilló (2004). This framework is a bit
different, though. In this framework there are two types of capital, working capital and energy
saving capital. The energy efficiency of the economy, υ, is given by the amount energy saving
capital installed in the plant, which can be accumulated independently from working capital, k.
Thus, capital services of one unit of working capital are
κt (ut) = ut min
{
et (ut) ,
ζ
ut
}
. (3.6)
Plants’ managers hire both types of capital every period before the energy price is known. The key
assumption is that accumulating energy saving capital is subject to adjustment costs which implies
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that energy use will respond sluggishly to energy prices. Appendix G describes this economy and
its associated quasi-social planner’s problem is
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ϕ log (`t))
s. t. ct + ιt ≤ At ζα kαt h1−αt − %tet,
ct ≥ 0, `t ≤ h¯− ht,
et+1 ≥ ζ (ιt−ψ(ut+1kt+1,utkt))ut+1(1+ut+1) + (1−$)
ut(1+ut)
ut+1(1+ut+1)
et,
0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ 11+ut+1 ιt −
ψ(ut+1kt+1,utkt)
1+ut+1
+ (1−$) 1+ut1+ut+1 kt,
k0, u0, and energy prices given, t ≥ 0,
(3.7)
where the total amount of energy saving capital is ut = ut kt. Services of working capital are just
κt = ζ kt. The total amount of investment, net of reallocation costs is xt =
(ιt−ψ(ut+1kt+1,utkt))
ut+1(1+ut+1)
,
which has to allocated to working capital and energy saving capital. The amount of energy saving
capital ut plays the role of energy efficiency in our setup, vt = u−1t . Notice that energy efficiency at
the plant level is reversible but the existence of adjustment costs, ψ(ut+1kt+1,utkt)1+ut+1 , has an aggregate
effect similar to irreversibility—it slows down the response of aggregate energy efficiency to changes
in energy prices. Thus, the response of energy efficiency in this economy is similar to that of Atkeson
and Kehoe (1999).
4 Calibration and estimation
In this section we describe the procedure used to calibrate our economy and the estimation of the
shocks. We briefly discuss the data that we use. We take the U.S. to be our reference economy.
We construct series for the energy price and energy consumption as well as economic aggregates
for the period 1960-2008. Since we assume that all energy is imported in our model economy, we
need to construct measures of value added, investment and the capital stock excluding, respectively,
output, investment, and capital of energy-producing sectors. Our measure of value added includes
the imputed services of consumer durable goods and government capital. Capital and aggregate
investment are defined accordingly. To obtain an aggregate series on energy consumption for the
US economy, we construct a constant-price measure of the consumption of coal, petroleum, natural
gas and electricity by end-use sectors. Correspondingly, our aggregate energy price is the ratio of
energy use measured in current prices to energy use measured in constant prices. A full explanation
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of the sources and methods used in our data construction is given in Appendix A.
4.1 The energy price shock
Following Atkeson and Kehoe (1999), we estimate an ARMA(1,1) process for the aforementioned
energy price deflator parameterized by
log %t+1 = (1− ρ) log %+ ρ log %t + φt + t+1, (4.1)
where  ∼ N (0, σ2 ) and % is the average energy price in the data. We find that ρ ' 0.94, φ ' 0.45
for 1960-08.
4.2 The specification of the investment specific shocks
In this section we discuss the set of observations that we are going to use to specify a structure for
the ISTC processes, Θt, Λt and Γt. First, we assume that Γt is constant. This is consistent with
assuming that the energy price has no trend, in line with our estimated price shown in expression
(4.1). Thus, we have left Θt, which affects the technology that transforms final good into investment
goods, and Λt, which affects the amount of capital services yielded by one unit of new capital. The
literature on growth or real business cycles that incorporates ISTC do not differentiate between its
two sources—higher productivity in producing investment goods or higher quality of those goods.
See for instance, Greenwood et al. (2000), or Fisher (2006), among others. This literature assumes
that the quality adjusted relative price of capital goods falls due to ISTC and estimates a process
to match the statitical properties of this price in the data. In our notation, this literature assumes a
relative price equal to q˜t = Θ−1t Λ
−1
t+1 since it abstracts from energy requirement. In that setting, the
more traditional approach in Greenwood et al. (2000) consists of estimating a process for q˜t that
features a deterministic trend and transitory shocks. After Fisher (2006), however, it is common to
estimate a process that features a stochastic trend.
Differently from the standard theory, we need to distinguish both ISTC sources. In order to do
so, we need to select two model variables and two sets of observations. In our theory, the two ISTC
shocks govern the evolution of the price of new investment, qt (t+ 1, vt+1) = Θ−1t , and the quality-
adjusted price of capital, qκt (t+ 1, vt+1) = Θ
−1
t Λ
−1
t+1 v
−1
t+1, as defined in (2.26). We chose as the
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data counterpart of qt the inverse of the ratio of the chain weighted NIPA deflator for non durable
consumption and services over that of durable consumption expenditures and private investment in
structures, which we denote asQt. We proceed in this way because the prices of durable expenditures
and investment in structures have significant quality bias in NIPA (see Gort et al. 1999). Next, we
use as the data counterpart of qκt (t+ 1, vt+1) the estimates of Gordon (1990) and Cummins and
Violante (2002) (hereafter the GCV deflator) of the inverse of the quality-adjusted relative price of
equipment and software, which we denote as Qκt .7
Now we need to specify a stochastic structure for both ISTC processes. We build on Fisher
(2006) and assume that the productivity in the production of capital goods, Θt, is non-stationary
and its growth rate, θ, is subject to shocks, zθt , whereas the quality level of new capital goods, Λt+1,
exhibits deterministic growth at the rate λ and it is subject to transitory shocks, zλt . Specifically:
Θt = Θt−1 eθ+z
θ
t , (4.2)
Λt+1 = (1 + λ)
tez
λ
t . (4.3)
There are two reasons why we choose Λt+1 to be subject to transitory instead of permanent shocks.
In this way, the empirical model used to estimate both processes, (4.2), and (4.3), is stationary
in first differences, as we will show in Section 4.4. There is another reason and it has to do
with the fact that the model variable used to identify Λt+1, the quality-adjusted relative price of
capital, qκt (t+ 1, vt+1), depends also on one non-observable variable, the efficiency type, vt+1. In
our identification strategy shown in Section 4.4 we use the fact that Λt+1 is only subject to transitory
shocks.
We are not the first in assuming two different shocks affecting Investment Specific Technical
Change. Justiniano et al. (2011) also specify two investment shocks to study business cycle fluctu-
ations in a neokeynesian model economy. There are significant differences, however, between their
approach and ours. As in Justiniano et al. (2011) we assume one of the shocks is permanent, and
it is the one that affects the productivity in the production of investment goods. These authors
use the NIPA deflators to estimate this process, but they check the robustness of their results to
the use of their update of the GCV deflator. They also assume the other investment shock to be
transitory but they interpret it in a different manner. They call it a shock to the marginal efficiency
7Rodríguez-López and Torres (2012) extend the GCV prices by using the metododology proposed by Cummins
and Violante (2002). We use this update.
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of investment (MEI hereafter) and estimate it using a proxy for the market value of firms. We
could think of our transitory shock to quality of new capital goods as a sort of MEI shock, although
making the mapping is difficult since Justiniano et al. (2011) abstract from energy requirements.
4.3 The stationary version of our model economy
It is convenient to obtain a stationary representation of our model economy by normalizing with
respect to the state of technology. In our economy, output and capital grow at different rates.
Moreover, since one of the ISTC shocks is permanent, our economy features a stochastic trend.
Proposition 3. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds, so that in equilibrium all installed capital is
utilized, et(z, v) > 0, for all t. Suppose that the energy price has no trend, that Γt = 1, for all t, and
that Θt and Λt are given by (4.2) and (4.3), respectively. The efficiency type vt+1 has a stochastic
trend given by
Ψt = Θ
−1
µ
t , for all t. (4.4)
Gross output, yt, investment and consumption, xt, ct, and pt et, have a trend Xt which satisfies
Xt = A
1
1−α
t−1 [Λt Θt−1]
α
1−α Θ
−α
µ(1−α)
t−1 . (4.5)
The trend of capital and capital services satisfy
Tt−1 = Xt Θt−1, T κt−1 = Λt Ψt−1 Tt−1. (4.6)
The trend of the relative price of capital and the trend of the relative price of capital services are,
respectively:
T qt = Θ
−1
t−1, T
qκ
t = T
q
t Λ
−1
t Ψt−1. (4.7)
Proof. Taking into account (2.17) and that gross output and energy expenditure should grow at the
same rate the result follows.
In our economy, capital —adjusted and not adjusted by quality— grows at a higher rate than
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output. The key difference with any other standard two sector model economy with ISTC (see, for
instance, Greenwood et al. 1997, or Fisher 2006) is the explicit modeling of energy demand. In
our theory, energy efficiency of new capital, measured by vt+1 has a stochastic trend given by the
stochastic growth of Θt, the productivity of the technology to produce capital goods. Higher Θt
implies that the economy becomes more capital intensive. For the energy share to remain constant,
energy efficiency should increase. Notice that changes in Λt do not affect the trend in energy
efficiency, vt+1. Its innovations, however, will affect the fluctuations in energy efficiency over time.
Finally, notice that the trend in the relative price of capital is given by the permanent shock Θt,
whereas the quality-adjusted price depends also on the trend of embodied technical change and that
of energy efficiency.
4.4 Empirical strategy
Figure 2(a) shows the NIPA deflator for private investment in structures and durable consumption
expenditures (hereafter, St&D) and the GCV deflator for investment in equipment and software
(hereafter E&S), over non-durable consumption and services. The former (NIPA St&D) is used as
a proxy for the price of new investment goods in our model economy, qt = Θ−1t , whereas the latter
(GCV E&S) proxies the relative price of capital services, qκt = Θ
−1
t Λ
−1
t+1 v
−1
t+1. We use these two
prices to estimate a joint process defined over Qt and Qκt as discussed in Section 4.2 above:
Qt = Qt−1 eθ+z
θ
t , (4.8)
Qκt = Qt (1 + λ)
t ez
λ˜
t , (4.9)
with ezλ˜t ≡ ezλt vt+1 since we cannot, a priori, disentangle the shocks in Λt+1 from the endogenous
response of energy efficiency vt+1.
A stationary representation of the joint investment specific technical change processes can be
described in a state space form according to
ξt+1 = Γ + Fξt + εzt+1 , state equation, (4.10)
yt = Hξt(+Axt) + νt, observation equation. (4.11)
where yt = [∇ logQκt ∇ logQt]′, εzmt = (1 − ρmL)zmt , with m = λ˜, θ, and Γ, F,H, and A are
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matrices of parameters. The term (+Axt) + et accounts for measurement error with exogenous
variables xt if necessary. The innovations νt are generated recursively using the Kalman filter,
and they are used to form the sample log likelihood function for observables yt. Parameters of
interest are estimated by maximising numerically this likelihood, and those estimates are used to
identify the ISTC shocks. The investment specific transitory shock, ε
zλ˜
is identified with the GCV
E&S deflator, whereas the permanent shock εzθ is identified with the NIPA St&D deflator. The
unobservable process is Λ˜t+1 ≡ Λt+1vt+1, and consequently Qκt = QtΛ˜t+1. With unit matrix H, the
empirical model can be then written:

∇ logQκt − (λ+ θ)
∇ logQt − θ
 =

ρλ ρθ − ρλ
0 ρθ


∇ logQκt−1 − (λ+ θ)
∇ logQt−1 − θ
+

1 1
0 1


ε
zλ˜t
εzθt
 (4.12)
Thus, zθt in (4.8) represents exactly the state ∇ logQt − θ ≡ St. However, combined states St and
Sκt ≡ ∇ logQκt−1 − (λ+ θ), represent zθt + zλ˜t − zλ˜t−1 ≡ ρθSt−1 + εzθt + ρλS
κ
t−1 + εzλ˜t
− ρλSt−1, where
zλ˜t ≡ zλt +log(vt+1) so we keep track of the bias in our estimation through the response of endogenous
variable vt+1 to the shocks. To identify the embodied technological change shock, zλt , we simulate
our model economy feeding to it the innovations zθt and zλ˜t (as well as the energy price innovations).
Then we obtain a path for energy efficiency vt+1 and calculate the innovation zλt = zλ˜t − log (vt+1).
We simulate again our model economy feeding to it zλt until the equilibrium price of quality-adjusted
capital in the model converges. We proceed in this way because quality innovations zλt only affect the
fluctuations of energy efficiency, vt+1, but not its trend, since we have assumed Λt+1 to be subject
only to transitory shocks. Consequently, the trend of the quality-adjusted price is not affected by
quality innovations.
Table 2 in its lower rows reports the parameter estimates obtained by using annual data over
both the benchmark sample period 1959-2009, and also 1947-2009. As a robustness check, we also
compute the estimates corresponding to quarterly data from 1959QIV to 2009QI and from 1947QIV
to 2009QI. It can be checked that all parameter estimates are in line with those reported in the
literature (Fisher 2006 or Justiniano et al. 2011, among others). For instance, σθ is about 0.5%
quarterly, and say, σλθ is about 6%, whereas ρθ is about 0.2 and ρλθ is about 0.7.
Figure 2(b) shows the correlation of the innovations zθt and zλt to the Qt and Qκt processes. To
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compute this correlation a window of 5 years (20 quarters, quarterly estimation) has been used. The
vertical red lines correspond to years 1974, 1978 and 1992. The correlation lies above average (zero
in the figure) right after the oil price shocks in the 1980s and the early 2000s, when the 2003-08
oil price shock first hits. On the contrary, the correlation lies below average during the late 1990s.
This picture suggests that ISTC innovations seem to be related to energy price changes but during
the 1990s.
Before showing our quantitative experiments we discuss the aggregate targets and the discipline
imposed by our theory to calibrate the model.
4.5 Aggregate targets
The calibration of the model closely follows the methods discussed in Atkeson and Kehoe (1999)
and Díaz et al. (2004). In this version of our benchmark economy we abstract from labor choice,
and concentrate on the behavior of investment. Parameter values are calibrated so that selected
statistics of the steady state of our economy match their counterparts in the data. Table 1 shows
the values of the calibrated parameters. In our data, the share of labor income over Value Added is
about 60 percent. This implies a value for α = 0.4406. Investment is 28.41 percent of gross output,
which implies a depreciation rate $ = 0.0523. We have two other technological parameters: the
stationary value for energy intensity, v˜µt+1 ≡ vµt+1/Θt, which determines the capital-energy ratio at
the steady state, and µ, which governs the dynamic response of energy use to shocks. The reason
why we need to set the steady state ratio v˜t+1 is because of the complementarity of capital and
energy at the plant level. Our theory accounts for the dynamics of such complementarity, but we
need to set its steady state level. Hence, the ratio vµt+1/Θt is set so that the aggregate share of
energy in our economy, in absence of shocks, is constant and equal to the mean of the considered
period. Finally, we have left to calibrate µ. As we show in Appendix D, the share of energy in gross
output for the latest vintage is equal to α/µ, which should be lower than the share for any older
vintage. As a matter of fact we show in Appendix D that
%t et (z, vz)
yt (z, vz)
=
α
µ
Λt Γt v
1−µ
t
Λz Γz v
1−µ
z
, for all z ≤ t. (4.13)
Thus we can use our theory to find an appropriate value for µ consistent with the aggregate share
of energy being constant and equal to its counterpart in the data. This value is µ = 16.2409.
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5 Quantitative experiments
In this section we show the main experiments conducted. To study the dynamics of aggregate energy
use and energy efficiency in our model economy we proceed in the following way: we feed into the
model the energy price and the two ISTC shocks, estimated in section 4.4, consistent with the fact
that the model delivers, endogenously, the path for the two relative prices of capital (the price of
structures and non durable goods and the GCV relative price) observed in the US economy for the
period 1990-2008. In this way we can measure the contribution of energy efficiency versus ISTC in
the dynamics of all macroecoonmic aggregates.
5.1 The data
We need to select the particular statistics that describe the dynamics of energy use and efficiency
appropriately in the data to compare them with their counterparts in our model economy. In Figure
3(a), we plot the logarithm of the share of energy, pE/V A, the relative price of energy, p, and energy
use, E/V A, for the US economy over the period 1960-2010.8 The share of energy has a very high
volatility, in spite of begin small on average, 4.75 percent of our measure of gross output for the
whole period 1960-2010, peaking 8.89 percent in 1981 and reaching a minimum of 3.18 percent in
1998.9 Let us turn to inspect our measure of energy price, p. The first thing that we notice is that
the price tracks very closely the evolution of the energy share. The second thing is the size of the
shocks experienced in the years 1974, 1979-81, and 2003-08 that dwarf other price shocks.10
Let us turn to inspect the evolution of energy use, the ratio E/V A. As we can see, this ratio is
falling since the early 1970s. This behavior, though, is a composite effect of changes in energy con-
sumption, E, and value added, V A. Figure 3(c) shows that energy consumption responds belatedly
to changes in energy prices but it has had a different behavior since the 1990s. In particular, it fell
during the late 1970s, when value added was stagnant and has grown at a slower pace than value
added since 1990. Thus, the ratio E/V A was more or less constant during the late 1980s and fell
8All aggregates have also been deflated using the implicit price deflator of non durable consumption goods and
services.
9It may be thought that the evolution of this share hides significant differences in prices for the different energy
sources considered. This is not the case; as pointed out by Kilian (2008), the pattern of fluctuations in the share of
energy primarily reflects changes in the price of crude oil rather than shifts in energy consumption.
10More than 50 percent of all energy included in our measure E is petroleum-based for the entire period 1960-2010.
That is, the important source of fluctuations in our measure of the energy price is the price of oil and its importance
in our price index has not changed significantly during the period considered.
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during the 1990s, in spite of the falling energy prices during that decade, and kept doing so during
the 2000s when we witnessed the last upsurge in the energy price.11
Now we turn to inspect Figure 3(b), where we show the capital to value added ratio, K/V A,
and the capital to energy ratio, K/E. Capital is measured in units of value added. Notice that the
ratio of both figures, (K/V A)/(K/E), is equal to energy use, E/V A. The capital to value added
ratio measures capital intensity and the capital to energy ratio is our aggregate measure of energy
efficiency. Notice that the capital to value added ratio fluctuated less than the capital to energy
ratio. This implies that the observed changes in energy use were mostly due to changes in aggregate
energy efficiency, as measured by K/E. This ratio responds with some sluggishness to energy prices.
When the price increases, the capital to energy ratio falls. This was the case for all years but for
the 1990s, where the ratio decreased in spite of the falling energy price. It is also interesting to note
that the capital to value added ratio decreased whereas the capital to energy ratio increased during
the 1990s. This suggests that capital was becoming more productive and more efficient at the same
time during that decade.
5.2 The dynamics of energy use and the capital-energy ratio
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show, respectively, the evolution of energy use, the energy share and the
evolution of our aggregate measure of efficiency, the capital to energy ratio. In this Figure capital
is measured in units of value added, in the model as well as in the data. Figure 4(a) shows that our
theory accounts remarkably well for the evolution of energy use in the US throughout the period
1960-2008. This is also why the energy share mimics so well its counterpart in the data.
In order to assess the importance of ISTC shocks in our theory of investment and energy use
we strip our economy from them. This alternative economy is essentially the economy studied
by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) calibrated to reproduce the aggregate targets shown in Table 1.
We should note that there is no steady state growth in the Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) economy,
whereas our economy features a stochastic trend. Thus, we compare the detrended version of our
economy with theirs. In this way we compare one economy where there are energy price shocks and
the relative price of investment is always one (AK economy hereafter) and another economy with
11It may be argued that the behavior of our measure of energy use is affected by the choice of base year prices.
For instance, Metcalf (2008) measures energy consumption as the ratio of the amount of BTUs yielded by various
energy sources to measured GDP. The behavior of his measure of energy use is fairly similar to the evolution of our
measure.
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energy price shocks and shocks to the relative price of capital services (our benchmark economy).
5.3 The role of ISTC shocks
The simulated evolution of energy use is shown in Figure 4(c). In the AK economy, energy use
reacts to prices more than in the benchmark economy. Moreover, it rises since mid 1980s until
the energy price starts rising again in the 2000s, missing completely the change of regime observed
during the 1990s. As for the capital to energy ratio, shown in Figure 4(d), two features of this ratio
stand out: first, its evolution is smoother than the evolution of its counterparts in the data and in
our benchmark economy, respectively, and, second, it also misses the change of regime during the
1990s.
To understand further the role of ISTC shocks we need to recall that labor is inelastically supplied
and all capital is always utilized in equilibrium in both model economies. Thus, after receiving a
shock, both economies respond by changing the level of investment and the energy efficiency built
into that investment. Figure 4(e) shows the evolution of the capital to value added ratio in both
economies. As we can see, this ratio is more responsive to energy price shocks in our benchmark
economy. This is so because investment is more volatile in the presence of ISTC shocks. The AK
economy also misses the fall in this ratio observed since the mid 1980s until the 1990s, which is
captured by our benchmark economy. Let us turn to inspect Figure 4(f) which compares the level
of efficiency built into new capital goods in our benchmark economy (red line) and the AK economy
(blue line). We are plotting here the detrended value of v−1t+1 (multiplied by Θ
1
µ
t ) with its counterpart
in the AK economy. Notice that energy efficiency is also less volatile in the AK economy than in
our benchmark economy. During the 1970s and early 1980s, our benchmark economy invests in
more efficient machines than the AK economy. This is so because ISTC growth is only realized
by investing, which rises the energy demand of the economy. If expected prices are high, the only
way to reduce the future energy bill is by investing in efficient machines. On the contrary, during
the 1990s, a period of high embodied ISTC growth and low energy prices, our benchmark economy
invest less in efficiency than the AK economy and produces an investment boom. This is so because
agents try to materialize all the benefits of transitory embodied ISTC shocks. In spite of the fall in
efficiency during the 1990s, energy use in our benchmark economy falls because the accelerated ISTC
embodied in new capital goods renders them more productive without rising energy consumption.
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5.4 Permanent versus transitory ISTC shocks
We have distinguished between a permanent shock to the production of investment goods, Θt, and a
transitory shock to the technical level embodied in the new capital good, Λt. Thus, we have specified
that ISTC allows to produce not only more machines but also better machines at the same cost
in units of final good. Typically, the literature on ISTC growth abstracts from such a distinction.
In our case, this decomposition is important because the two shocks have different effects on the
demand of energy and, therefore, in the level of efficiency built into new capital goods. In this
section we would like to assess the contribution of each shock separately.
We start by shutting down the transitory shock and simulate again our economy. Basically,
the permanent ISTC shock is needed to capture the trend in energy use and the capital to energy
ratio observed in the data, as shown in Figure 5(c), specially after the 1990s. Permanent shocks
alone, however, cannot capture the fluctuations in the capital to energy ratio. This is mirrored by
the lower volatility of efficiency of new capital goods, as shown in Figure 5(e). Now we shut the
permanent shock and leave the transitory shock only. This economy cannot capture the change of
regime observed in 1990s; as we can see in Figure 5(b), energy use has no trend after 1990s, whereas
it has a negative trend in the data. The implication of this behavior of energy use is that the capital
to energy ratio has no trend either, as shown in Figure 5(d).
Summarizing, permanent shocks are needed to capture the trends observed in energy use and the
capital to energy ratio, whereas the transitory shocks are mostly needed to capture the fluctuations
in the capital to energy ratio. Fluctuations in energy efficiency are affected by both permanent and
transitory ISTC shocks. Figures 5(e) and 5(f), however, confirm our guess: Embodied technical
change (the one we have assumed to be transitory) is a sort of energy saving technical change. In
particular, during the 1990s investment in efficiency would have been higher had embodied technical
change not accelerated. It is interesting to note, though, that the evolution of the capital to value
added ratio is very similar in both economies (when capital is measured in units of output), as shown
in Figures 5(g) and 5(h). This implies that in order to disentangle permanent from transitory ISTC
shocks we need further information that the one provided by the capital to value added ratio. Hence,
our theory of investment and energy use gives us guidance about how to identify both ISTC shocks.
29
5.5 The short run price elasticity of energy use
Finally, it has been argued that the relationship between energy prices and the macroeconomy seems
to have changed in the last two decades, since the response of GDP to the 2003-08 oil-price shock
has been much softer than in the 1970s and 1980s (see, for instance, Kilian 2008, or Blanchard
and Galí 2007). On this respect, Baumeister and Peersman (2012) find evidence of a decrease in
the short run price elasticity of aggregate energy demand. This is corroborated by microeconomic
evidence that suggests that the short run price elasticity of energy demand to energy prices may
have changed and, in fact, decreased and that this change is due to the fact that capital has become
more energy efficient over time; see Edelstein and Kilian (2007), Metcalf (2008), or Steinbuks and
Neuhoff (2010).
Our theory tells us that these findings are related and key to understand the effects of the 2003-
08 oil price shock. In our model economy, right after an unexpected price shock energy consumption,
et, does not change since all capital installed is utilized in equilibrium. Vale added, though, falls
and, therefore, so does energy use (energy consumption per unit of value added, et/ (yt − %tet)).
Appendix E shows that the value of the short run elasticity of energy use with respect to the price
is equal to the share of energy in value added,
εeut =
%t et
yt − %t et . (5.1)
Hence, according to our theory, by increasing investment in the years of high ISTC the economy
was increasing the average efficiency of capital and lowering the response of energy use (and value
added) to energy price shocks. This implication of our theory is shown in Figure 3(a), which depicts
energy use and the energy share in the data. The energy price level in the peak years 1981 and
2008 is around 60 percent above the mean of the entire period. Yet, the energy share is significantly
lower in 2008; 6.66 percent versus 8.89 in 1981. Thus, according to our theory, energy use has been
less responsive to changes in energy prices during the last oil price shock because energy efficiency
is much higher than in previous decades.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose a theory to study how technology shapes the response of energy demand to
energy price changes. In our theory, aggregate demand of energy depends on the complementarity
of capital and energy at the plant level and the state of investment specific technical change (ISTC).
The complementarity is modeled as an energy requirement built into irreversible capital, whereas
ISTC implies that capital of different vintages differ in productivity due to technical progress. Thus,
capital is heterogenous in two dimensions: its vintage and its energy requirement. A lower energy
requirement (higher efficiency) comes at the cost of less capital services.
In our model, energy prices and the nature of investment specific technical change affect the
choice of energy requirement built into new capital units. If ISTC reduces the cost of producing new
capital goods, higher investment rises the exposure to energy price risk, which will entice investing in
energy efficient, less productive, capital. If ISTC brings higher quality in capital, higher investment
becomes more productive without providing an energy burden, which reduces the incentives to invest
in energy efficiency. The complementarity of capital and energy at the plant level implies that the
energy share in aggregate gross output varies with the distribution of capital across vintages and
efficiency levels. We can, however, establish conditions under which there is a representation for
aggregate gross output by aggregating capital using cost production prices.
Nevertheless, the complex interaction of ISTC and energy efficiency cannot be ascertained the-
oretically. This is why we study the dynamic properties of our theory quantitatively. To do so, we
calibrate our model economy to match selected statistics of the US economy. Then, we focus on
three shocks: one governing the energy price and two other governing the extensive and intensive
margins of ISTC. The identification of these shocks relies on observables: the relative price of en-
ergy and the relative price of investment goods, not quality adjusted as well as quality adjusted.
One of the points that we make in this paper is that the identification of ISTC shocks in existing
literature reduces the scope of factors that influence the efficiency of producing investment goods
relative to consumption goods. According to our theory, however, the relative price of investment
goods depends not only on the two ISTC shocks but also on the energy efficiency built into capital
units. Thus, the model imposes a novel discipline to disentangle the effects of ISTC shocks from
the effects of energy efficiency. This discipline can be interpreted as a theoretical foundation to the
view expressed by Gordon (1996), who argued that changes in energy efficiency is one of the key
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determinants of the dynamics of the relative price of investment goods. Our theory also gives us a
discipline for aggregating output and capital in a way that is consistent with National Accounts.
Our model with ISTC accounts for the fall of energy use per unit of output observed during
the 1990s, a period in which energy prices fell below trend. This pattern of the data cannot be
accounted for by previous theories of energy demand, which abstract from ISTC and assume that
all technical change is neutral. According to previous theories, the fall in the energy price during
the 1990s should have induced higher investment in less efficient capital and a rise in energy use per
unit of output. According to our theory, the 1990s were a period of accelerated ISTC that raised
quality of capital substantially. This rise in productivity allowed to lower energy efficiency of new
capital goods and, at the same time, reduced energy use per unit of output at the aggregate level.
We have abstracted from the determinants of energy supply as well as from either environmental
concerns or exhaustible energy. Although we have focused our analysis on annual fluctuations, we
think that this theory can be used to address more longer term questions as climate change. We
have also abstracted from taxes and the related issue of giving subsidies to using renewable energies.
We leave these issues for further research.
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Appendix
A The data
In this Appendix we document the construction of the data series we use in the empirical part of the
paper. We obtain data from two sources: the Annual Energy Review (2000) and National Income
and Product Accounts. The data we use can be accessed in the addresses: http://www.eia.gov/ and
http://www.bea.gov. From now on we will refer to each source as AER, and NIPA, respectively.
Our data set is available upon request.
A.1 Output, consumption, investment, and the capital stock
We follow the method described by Cooley and Prescott (1995) to construct broad measures of
output, consumption, investment, and the capital stock. Specifically, our measure of capital includes
private stock of capital, the stock of inventories, the stock of consumer durable goods and the
government stock. Consequently, the measured value of GDP is augmented with the imputed flow
of services from the stock of durable goods and the government stock. We subtract from each of the
series of output, investment and capital the corresponding series for the energy producing sectors:
oil and gas extraction, electricity and gas services, petroleum and coal production, and pipeline
transportation, as our theory cannot account for the behavior of the energy-producing sectors. We
have information on the three variables for the last two sectors but about the first two sectors we
only have information about the net stock of capital, and we use it to impute estimates of output
and investment. Gross output is the sum of value added and the final expenditure on energy. Real
variables are obtained by dividing the nominal variables by the implicit price deflator of non durable
consumption goods and services.
A.2 Energy price, use, and expenditures series
Our energy data covers the primary energy consumption of end-users and is obtained from the
Annual Energy Review (AER, hereafter). We consider four forms of energy: coal, petroleum,
natural gas and electricity. AER (Table 2.1a) gives data on total energy consumption by end users
measured in British termal units (BTUs) disaggregated into the four forms of energy considered.
We denote these data on energy consumption for each type of energy by Qit, where the index i
denotes the form of energy.
This measure Qit is already net of energy consumption of the electricity sector. We subtract from
total primary energy consumption of the industrial sector that of four energy sectors: oil and gas
extraction, electricity and gas services, petroleum and coal production, and pipeline transportation.
The BEA gives information on the net stock of Fixed Assets by industry and we assume that
the amount of BTUs consumed by those four sectors, as a proportion of BTUs consumed by the
industrial sector, is the same that the amount of capital in those sectors as a proportion of assets
in the industrial sector.
We construct a constant-price measure of energy consumption. We choose the base year to be
2005 and define total energy use to be Et =
∑
i
QitPi0, where Pi0 is the price in dollars per BTUs of
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energy type in 2005 from AER, divided by the implicit price deflator of non durable consumption
goods and services in NIPA (which is constructed as a weighted average of the two implicit price
deflators). For coal, natural gas and petroleum we use the production price series (AER, Table
3.1). For electricity, we use the retail price of electricity sold by electric utilities (see AER, Table
8.10). In Table 8.10 the price for electricity is in cents per kilowatt-hour. We use AER Table A.6 to
convert the price to cents per BTUs. All prices are in real terms; i.e., divided by the implicit price
deflator of non durable consumption goods and services. We construct the energy price deflator as
pt =
∑
i
QitPit∑
i
QitPi0
. (A.1)
Finally, energy expenditure is pt · Et =
∑
i
QitPit.
B The quasi-social planner’s problem
The efficient allocation for this economy can be found as the solution to the following planning
problem:
max
ct,xt(t+1,v),
`t,kt+1(t+1,v)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (`t))
s. t. ct +
∞∫
0
xt(v) d v ≤
t∑
z=−∞
∞∫
0
(1−$)t−zkz(z, v) [yt(z, v)− %t et(z, v)] d v,
0 ≤ yt(z, v) ≤ At κt (z, v)α ht (z, v)1−α ,
0 ≤ κt(z, v) ≤ ΛzΓzv1−µet (z, v) ,
0 ≤ et(z, v) ≤ Γ−1z vµ,
0 ≤ `t ≤ h¯−
t∑
z=−∞
∞∫
0
(1−$)t−zkz(z, v)ht(z, v)d v,
0 ≤ ht(z, v) ≤ h¯,
0 ≤ kt+1(t+ 1, v) ≤ Θt xt(v), t ≥ 0,
kz(z, v) given, z ≤ t, v ≥ 0.
(B.1)
C Decentralization of the efficient allocation
Here we show how to decentralize the economy described in Section 2.
C.1 Market arrangements
We assume that households are the owners of the plants and, therefore, of the capital installed.
There is a market for plants that opens at the end of the period, once profits have been realized.
Notice, though, that capital is not traded since it is already installed in a plant and it cannot be
reallocated. Since there is a one to one correspondence between plants and units of capital, the
price of a plant is also equal to the price of the unit of capital installed, pt(z, v), where pt(z, v) is the
34
price of one unit of capital of vintage z and type v at the end of period t in units of consumption
good at time t. We further assume that all households start out with the same amount of shares of
the plants installed. Additionally, we assume that households trade a one risk free bond which is in
zero net supply.
The timing is the following: At the end of period t − 1 any prospective plant must install one
unit of capital before the energy price is known. After this decision has been made, at the beginning
of period t the uncertainty is resolved: agents learn the productivity of the investment technology
Θt and the quality of new capital goods, Λt+1. The energy price is realized. Then, they decide the
amount of energy to be consumed, et (z, v), and the number of workers hired, ht (z, v). Households
consume and save. A fraction $ of plants die.
C.1.1 The household’s problem
Plants of any vintage and type can be traded at the individual level. New investment, however,
comes in new vintage—it is a technological restriction, as in the one sector model TFP grows
exogenously, we cannot help to be more productive. Agents can, though, choose the type of the
new capital units to be installed. The household’s problem can be written in the following way:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (`t))
s. t. ct +
∞∫
0
xt(v) d v +
t+1∑
z=−∞
∞∫
0
pt(z, v)mt+1(z, v) d v + bt+1 ≤ wt (h¯− `t) +
(
1 + rbt
)
bt+
∞∫
0
pt(t+ 1, v) kt+1(t+ 1, v) d v +
t∑
z=−∞
∞∫
0
[(1−$) pt(z, v) + pit (z, v)]mt(z, v) d v,
kt+1(t+ 1, v) ≤ Θt xt(v), v > 0,
xt ≥ 0, mt+1(z, v) ≥ 0, kt+1(t+ 1, v) ≥ 0, for all z ≤ t+ 1, v > 0,
bt+1 ≥ b,
m0(z, v), b0, and energy prices given.
(C.1)
The constraint kt+1(t+ 1, v) ≤ Θt xt(v) implies that the amount of new capital that agents can sell
in the market cannot be higher that the amount of good needed to create them.
C.1.2 The plant’s problem
max
yt(z,v)≥0, ht(z,v)≥0,
et(z,s)≥0
pit(z, v) = yt(z, v)− wtht(z, v)− %t et(z, v)
s. t. yt(z, v) ≤ At κt (z, v)α ht (z, v)1−α ,
κt (z, v) ≤ Λz Γz v1−µ min
{
et (z, v) ,Γ
−1
z v
µ
}
.
(C.2)
C.1.3 Definition of equilibrium
An equilibrium for this economy, given the sequence of energy prices, {%t}∞t=0, is a sequence of
prices
{
{pt(z, v)}t+1z=−∞ , wt, rbt
}∞
t=0
, an allocation
{
ct, `t, {mt(z, v)}t+1z=−∞ , xt(v), kt+1(t+ 1, v), bt+1
}
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for each consumer, and an allocation for each plant of variety (z, v), {yt(z, v), ht(z, v), κt(z, v), et(z, v)}tz=−∞,
v ∈ R++, such that:
1.
{
ct, `t, {mt(z, .)}t+1z=−∞ , xt(v), bt+1
}
solves the household’s problem shown in (C.1) given the
sequence of prices,
2. {yt(z, v), ht(z, v), et(z, v)}tz=−∞, v ∈ R++, solves the plant’s problem given the sequence of
prices,
3. the relative price of the latest vintage is pt(t+ 1, v) = Θ−1t , for any v,
4. markets clear,
(a) the bond is in zero net supply, bt+1 = 0,
(b) the amount of plants of class (z, v) must be equal to the amount of capital of that class,
mt(z, v) = kt(z, v), for all z ≤ t, v > 0,
(c) the labor market clears, h¯− `t =
∑t
z=−∞
∫∞
0 mt(z, v)ht(z, v) d v,
(d) the final good market satisfies ct + xt =
∑t
z=−∞
∫∞
0 mt(z, v) yt(z, v) d v,
5. and the law of motion of capital of class (z, v) is kt(z, v) = (1 − ω)t−zΘz−1xz−1(v), for all
t ≥ z, v ∈ IR+, for all t.
C.1.4 Some properties of equilibrium
We have shown in Section 2.5 some properties of the efficient allocation. In this economy, given
the energy prices, the Welfare Theorems hold; thus, in equilibrium Propositions 1 to 2, as well as
Corollary 2, hold. Thus, we keep Assumption 1. Clearly, as shown in Proposition 2, the price of
a new plant, pt (t+ 1, vt+1), is equal to the cost of producing the unit of capital installed in that
plant, which was defined as qt (t+ 1, vt+1) = Θ−1t . Moreover, we know, using Proposition 2 that
agents only invest in one type of capital, that for which the present value of all future profits is
maximized. The price of an old plant is equal to the present value of profits that the plant will
accrue in the future:
pt (z, vz) = Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i
ϕt
[
α yt+i (z, vz)− %t+i Γ−1z vµz
]
, (C.3)
Using (2.12) we can write (C.3) as
pt (z, vz) =
Λz vz
Λt+1 vt+1
pt (t+ 1, vt+1)+
(
Λz vz
Λt+1 vt+1
− Γ
−1
z v
µ
z
Γ−1t+1 v
µ
t+1
)
Et
∞∑
i=1
(1−$)i−1ϕt+i
ϕt
%t+i Γ
−1
t+1 v
µ
t+1.
(C.4)
Since for the latest class of capital the present value of all energy expenditures is equal to the
fraction α/µ of expected gross output, using (2.16) we find that
pt (z, vz) =
Λz vz
Λt+1 vt+1
Θ−1t +
(
Λz vz
Λt+1 vt+1
− Γ
−1
z v
µ
z
Γ−1t+1 v
µ
t+1
)
Θ−1t
µ− 1 . (C.5)
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This price is different than the cost of of unit of capital installed, as defined in Definition 1, since it
takes into account the associated cost of energy. Actually if the ratio of capital services to energy
expenditure is higher than in a new plant, then pt (z, vz) > qt (z, vz); otherwise the cost valuation
is higher than the market price of the plant, pt (z, vz) < qt (z, vz).
D Calibration
Let us write the planner’s problem in the following way:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (h¯− ht))
s. t. ct + xt ≤ At (Θt−1 Λt vt κ˜t)α h1−αt − %t et,
et+1 ≥ Γ−1t+1 vµt+1 Θt xt + (1−$) et,
0 ≤ κ˜t+1 ≤ xt + (1−$) vt Λt Θt−1vt+1 Λt+1 Θt κ˜t,
κ˜0 given, xt ≥ 0.
(D.1)
κ˜t is the amount of capital services in units of gross output (i.e., multiplied by qt−1κ). We calibrate
α so that labor share in Value Added matches its corresponding counterpart in the data. Let us
now turn to the law of motion of capital. Since capital is expressed in units of gross output, the
ratio must be constant at the steady state,
yt+1
yt
κ˜t+1
yt+1
=
xt
yt
+ (1−$) vt Λt Θt−1
vt+1 Λt+1 Θt
κ˜t
yt
. (D.2)
Matching the capital-output ratio and the investment ratio yields
1− $˜ ≡ (1−$) vt Λt Θt−1
vt+1 Λt+1 Θt
. (D.3)
Since qκt = Θ
−1
t Λ
−1
t+1 v
−1
t+1, we can obtain
1−$ = (1− $˜) q
κ
t−1
qκt
. (D.4)
At the steady state, the share of energy, %t et/yt, must be constant, as ct/yt and the investment
ratio. Now we can rewrite the law of motion of energy as
%t
%t+1
yt+1
yt
%t+1 et+1
yt+1
=
(
Γt+1
%t
)−1
vµt+1 Θt
xt
yt
+ (1−$) %t et
yt
. (D.5)
Thus, matching the energy share determines the stationary value of v˜µt ,
v˜µt =
(
Γt+1
%t
)−1
vµt+1 Θt. (D.6)
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We have left obtaining µ. Unless we assume that there is no neutral progress, we cannot use the
gross output growth rate to calibrate µ. For the same reason, we cannot use qκt . We know that for
any new vintage installed, energy expenditures are the share α/µ of gross output. If, at the steady
state, the energy price is constant, %t = %, for all t, by using (2.16) it is easy to show that
%t et (t, vt)
yt (t, vt)
=
α
µ
, for all t. (D.7)
Likewise,
%t et (z, vz)
yt (z, vz)
=
α
µ
Λt Γt v
1−µ
t
Λz Γz v
1−µ
z
, for all z ≤ t. (D.8)
The energy share on aggregate gross output is
%t et
yt
=
t∑
z=−∞
%t et (z, vz)
yt (z, vz)
yt (z, vz) (1−$)t−z Θz−1 xz−1
yt
. (D.9)
Now, using our aggregation strategy and the fact the economy is at a steady state, we find that
%t et
yt
=
α
µ
t∑
z=−∞
(
1−$
1+gy
)t−z
t∑
z=−∞
(
1−$
1+gκ(µ)
)t−z . (D.10)
Calling αe to the share of energy in gross output in the data,
αe =
α
µ
t∑
z=−∞
(
1−$
1+gy
)t−z
t∑
z=−∞
(
1−$
1+gκ(µ)
)t−z . (D.11)
This is a non-linear equation in µ, since it affects the growth rate of capital services, gκ(µ). It must
be that αe is greater than α/µ, since older vintages operate with higher energy requirements that
the new one. This is a key difference with Atkeson and Kehoe (1999).
E The short run elasticity of energy use
In our notation, energy use is
eut =
et
yt − %t et . (E.1)
Differentiating both sides with respect to %t, and multiplying by %t/eut we find
∂ eut
∂ %t
%t
eut
=
∂ et
∂ %t
%t
et
+ set −
1− α
1− set
∂ ht
∂ %t
%t
ht
. (E.2)
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set is the share of energy in value added. In our model economy energy consumption does not change
after a price shock given our Assumption 1. Moreover, labor is inelastically supplied. Thus, the
elasticity of energy use is
εeut = s
e
t . (E.3)
F The cost of saving energy in a putty-clay model economy
Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) abstract from investment specific technological progress but retain the
assumption about efficiency types and capital irreversibility. In particular, the amount of capital
services, κt (u), depends on the amount of energy used in the plant, et (u) ≥ 0, according to the
technology
κt (u) = f(u) min
{
et (u) ,
1
u
}
, (F.1)
where f(u) is a strictly increasing function of v, where f ′(u) ≥ 0, and f ′′(u) < 0. In this economy,
the efficiency type u plays the same role that v−1 in our model economy. The production of one new
unit of capital always takes one unit of output, which is equivalent to assuming in our framework
that Θt = 1, for all t.
The firms optimally choose et(u) = u−1 and κt(u) = f(u)/u. By denoting v = f(u)/u, it is easy
to show that et(v) is an increasing and convex function of v. Thus, the social planner’s problem in
this case is exactly the one shown in expression (2.35). In this economy, the capital-energy ratio is
solely governed by changes in capital type, v, which respond to changes in energy prices.
G A Putty-Putty model of energy with costly capital reallocation
This is a simplified version of Díaz, Puch, and Guilló (2004) in our environment.
G.1 Preferences
There is a continuum of households that seek to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility,
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (`t)) , β ∈ (0, 1) , ξ > 0, (G.1)
where ct is consumption and `t is leisure t. Each household is endowed with h¯ units of time and,
therefore, works h¯− `t hours every period.
G.2 Technology
Production of the unique final good is carried out at a continuum of autonomous plants which are
indexed by the amount of energy-saving capital used, v. In each plant output is produced with
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labor, energy and the unit of working capital installed, according to the technology
yt (v) = At κt (v)
α ht (v)
1−α , (G.2)
with 0 < α < 1, where At is the growth factor of the disembodied technological knowledge, κt (v)
is the amount of services provided by the unit of working capital installed, whereas ht (v) is the
amount of labor services employed in the plant. The amount of services yielded by the unit of
working capital, κt (v), depends on the amount of energy used in the plant, et (v), and the amount
of energy-saving capital installed, v, according to the technology
κt (v) = v min
{
et (v) ,
ζ
v
}
. (G.3)
Each period households save and have the possibility of transforming final good into new units
of working capital or new units of energy-saving capital. Investing in energy-saving capital, though,
is subject to adjustment costs, which imply that working capital cannot be transformed on a one-
to-one basis into energy-saving capital, and vice versa. Households rent out energy-saving capital to
plants in period t− 1 to be used in period t. Plants can be scrapped at no cost. Finally, at the end
of the period, once production has taken place, the unit of working capital installed has a positive
probability of death, $ ∈ [0, 1], which is i.i.d. across types and plants. This death probability
plays the role of physical depreciation of working capital. To simplify the exposition of the model,
energy-saving capital depreciates at the same rate $ ∈ [0, 1].
G.3 Planner’s problem
Notice that since plants can be scrapped at no cost, and the amount of energy-saving capital can
be changed every period, all plants are ex-ante identical at all periods. Moreover, the total number
of plants is always equal to the amount of working capital, kt. Thus, the problem of a household is
max
ct,xt(v),
`,kt+1(v)
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ϕ log (`t))
s. t. ct + xt ≤
∞∫
0
kt(v) [yt(v)− %t et(v)] d v,
0 ≤ yt(v) ≤ At κt (v)α ht (v)1−α ,
0 ≤ κt(v) ≤ v et (v) ,
0 ≤ et(v) ≤ ζv ,
0 ≤ `t ≤ 1−
∞∫
0
kt(v)ht(v)d v,
0 ≤ ht(v) ≤ 1,
kt+1 + vt+1 − (1−$) (kt + vt) + ψ (vt+1,vt) ≤ xt,
kt+1(v) ≥ 0,
∞∫
0
kt+1(v) d v ≤ kt+1,
vt+1 ≥
∞∫
0
v kt+1(v) d v,
k0(v) given, v ≥ 0.
(G.4)
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G.4 Properties of the efficient allocation
Proposition App. 1. The ratio labor to working capital services is the same across all classes of
working capital used:
(1− α)At κt(v)αht(v)−α = u` (ct, `t)
uc (ct, `t)
. (G.5)
Now we turn to investigate which classes are allocated energy.
Proposition App. 2. If a time t the type v > 0, is allocated energy, et(v) > 0, then it must be the
case that et(v) = ζ v−1 and κt(v) = ζ.
The previous Proposition implies a rule for the utilization of capital.
Corollary App. 1. Only installed working capital of types v ≥ vt are utilized in equilibrium, where
vt is defined as
αA
1
α
t
(
1− α
wt
) 1−α
α
v = %t, (G.6)
and wt ≡ u`(ct,`t)uc(ct,`t) . The type vt increases with %t.
Let us turn now to analyze the investment decision and the characteristics of the new plants.
Proposition App. 3. Working capital is installed to one efficiency type vt+1 > 0, kt+1 (vt+1) > 0.
Proof. The first order condition with respect to kt+1(v) is
Ψkt + vΨ
v
t = Etλt+1 [α yt+1(v)− %t+1et+1(v)] + Ψk0t (v), (G.7)
where Ψkt is the first order condition with respect the aggregate kt+1, Ψvt is the first order condition
with respect to vt+1, Ψk0t (v) is the multiplier associated to the non-negativity constraint on kt+1(v),
and λt+1 is marginal utility of consumption at time t+ 1. Using Proposition App. 2 we can write
the previous expression as
Ψkt + vΨ
v
t = Etλt+1
[
αA
1
α
t+1
(
1− α
wt+1
) 1−α
α
ζ − %t+1 ζ v−1
]
+ Ψk0t (v), (G.8)
If kt+1(v) > 0, then Ψk0t (v) = 0. Continuity of both sides of (G.8) with respect to v imply that
only one type is used in equilibrium. Since working capital can be reallocated across types, only a
particular type vt+1 is used.
G.5 Aggregation
In this economy, at any period t only one efficiency type is used at every period. Thus, all plants
are alike and aggregate output is yt = yt(vt) kt; likewise happens to labor. Moreover, services of
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working capital are just κt = ζ kt. The total amount of capital is kt +vt = (1 + vt) kt. The amount
of energy used every period is et = ζ kt/vt. Thus, we can write the planner’s problem as
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (log (ct) + ξ log (`t))
s. t. ct + xt ≤ At ζα kαt h1−αt − %tet,
ct ≥ 0, `t ≤ 1− ht,
et+1 ≥ ζ (xt−ψ(vt+1kt+1,vtkt))vt+1(1+vt+1) xt + (1−$)
vt(1+vt)
vt+1(1+vt+1)
et,
0 ≤ kt+1 ≤ 11+vt+1 xt −
ψ(vt+1kt+1,vtkt)
1+vt+1
+ (1−$) 1+vt1+vt+1 kt,
k0, v0, and energy prices given, t ≥ 0.
(G.9)
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Figure 1: Energy requirement.
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(a) Alternative measures of the relative price of
investment. NIPA St&D is based on the National
Income and Product Accounts deflators for struc-
tures and durables. GCV E&S uses the Gordon-
Cummins-Violante deflator for equipment and soft-
ware.
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(b) A measurement of the joint evolution of the in-
novations to investment specific disturbances.
Figure 2: Investment prices and correlation of innovations.
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(b) Capital-energy ratio and capital-value added ra-
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(c) Energy use, E, Value Added, V A, and the price
of energy, p, for the US economy.
Figure 3: Energy use and energy efficiency in the US economy.
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(d) Capital to energy ratio
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(e) Capital to value added ratio
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
 E & IS shocks 
 Only E shocks 
 L
og
 
(f) Efficiency of the new capital goods, v−1t+1
Figure 4: The benchmark economy (red line), the economy without ISTC shocks (blue line), and
the data (black line).
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(h) Capital to value added ratio
Figure 5: Permanent (pink line) versus transitory shocks (green line).
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Table 1: Aggregate targets
Param. Observation Value
Preferences
β K/(V A+ pE) = 2.66 0.9545
Technology
α wL/(V A+ pE) = 55.94% 0.4406
$ I/(V A+ pE) = 28.41% 0.0523
v˜µ pE/(V A+ pE) = 4.51% 0.0160
µ energy share in vintage t = α/µ 16.2409
Notes: Average for period 1960-2008. u(c) = ln c, V A = measured
GDP + services of consumer durables + services of public capital
− VA of energy producing sectors.
Table 2: State space representation of embodied and disembodied technical progress. Full sample:
1947-2009, and restricted sample: 1959-2009, in annual and quarterly frequency.
λ θ ρλ ρθ σλ σθ
Quarterly Data 0.0073 0.0023 0.6622 0.2856 0.0063 0.0052
47:04 - 09:01 (0.0010) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Quarterly Data 0.0078 0.0028 0.7223 0.2633 0.0054 0.0049
59:04 - 09:01 (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Annual Data 0.0303 0.0092 0.0368 0.2336 0.0282 0.0139
1947 - 2009 (0.0079) (0.0005) (0.0137) (0.0020) (0.0026) (0.0004)
Annual Data 0.0323 0.0112 0.1444 0.1463 0.0272 0.0125
1959 - 2009 (0.0119) (0.0007) (0.0114) (0.0021) (0.0053) (0.0006)
Observations (1) 246 (2) 198 (3) (4) 61 (5) 49 (6)
LL (1) -1831 (2) -1522 (3) (4) -306 (5) -253 (6)
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. All estimates are significant at 1%. F-test for joint
significance.
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